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ARTICLES
STAY THE HAND: NEW DIRECIONS FOR THE
ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT
Thomas France* and Jack Tuholske**
The wolf has long been depicted in story and song as a mysterious menace
to man's very existence.. . . As a result we have been driven by an ethic
which would lead to the wolf's extinction.. But Congress has now mandated
that each person who would slay the wolf must stay his hand.
-Judge
I.

Miles Lord

INTRODUCTION

The 1973 passage of the Endangered Species Act' (ESA) stands as a
landmark event in the evolution of wildlife law in the United States. While
earlier statutes such as the National Environmental Policy Act 2 (NEPA)
and the Fish and Wildlife Coordination Act3 required the consideration of
wildlife values in federal agency decision making, the ESA mandated
substantive protections for plants and animals listed under it as threatened
or endangered.4 These protections have sharply modified or halted numerous activities which had the potential for affecting listed species. 5
While the ESA has made an undeniable contribution towards
protecting rare plant and wildlife species in the United States over the past
* Thomas France graduated with honors from the University of Montana School of Law in 1981.
He is presently an attorney with the National Wildlife Federation and directs the Federation's
Northern Rockies Resource Center in Missoula. Mr. France also supervises the clinical program in
natural resources law at the University of Montana School of Law.
** Jack Tuholske graduated from the University of Montana School of Law with honors in 1985.
He is engaged in private practice in Missoula, Montana and frequently works with conservation groups
on a variety of natural resource issues.
1. 16 U.S.C. §§ 1531-1543 (1982).
2. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982).
3. 16 U.S.C. §§ 661-669 (1982).
4. In addition, the ESA is broader in its application than NEPA, which applies only to major
federal actions significantly affecting the environment. By contrast, the ESA applies to all federal
activities however modest. Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 611 (9th Cir. 1984).
5. See generally Coggins and Russell, Beyond Shooting Snail Darters into Pork Barrels:
Endangered Species and Land Use in America, 70 GEo. L.J. 1433 (1982). This excellent,
comprehensive article analyzes impacts of the Act on land and resource management, and predicts
even greater future applications. In addition to an exhaustive compilation of case law and legislative
history, the article recognizes the importance of the conservation and taking duties discussed herein.

PUBLIC LAND LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 7

fifteen years, key provisions of the law have received little attention from
either federal agencies or the courts. In particular, the ESA's imposition of
an affirmative duty on federal agencies to take all steps necessary to recover
threatened and endangered wildlife populations to the point where they no
longer need the protections of the Act 6 has been largely overlooked.
Similarly, the potential breadth of the Act's prohibitions against the taking
of any listed species 7 has received only limited judicial scrutiny.
Several recent initiatives on the part of both federal agencies and the
nation's private conservation organizations have, however, focused renewed attention on these key provisions. As the importance of these
measures continues to emerge, further changes in federal decision making
and the better management of listed plants and animals can be expected.
II.

THE INITIAL IMPACTS OF THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT

To understand fully the way in which the affirmative duty and taking
provisions of the ESA are beginning to alter management practices of
federal agencies and private entities involved in resource development, it is
necessary to review how the Act traditionally has been implemented by
federal agencies and interpreted by the federal courts.
As the ESA has evolved since 1973, there can be little question that its
most important component has been the so-called jeopardy provisions of
section 7.8 While other parts of the Act, such as the process for the listing of
threatened species,9 have greatly benefited endangered wildlife, section 7
has dramatically reoriented the approach taken by federal agencies when
their activities affect endangered species.
Under section 7, every federal agency must insure that any action
authorized, funded, or carried out by it "is not likely to jeopardize" any
threatened or endangered species or result in the destruction or adverse
modification of habitat critical to the survival of such species.' 0 The
mechanism for insuring that these responsibilities are carried out is a
consultation process between federal agencies and the United States Fish
and Wildlife Service (FWS). Whenever a federal agency embarks on a
6. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1).
7. 16 U.S.C. § 1538.
8. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
9. 16 U.S.C. § 1533. The listing process entails submission of a petition by an interested person
under 5 U.S.C. § 553(c) (1982), the rulemaking provision of the Administrative Procedures Act.
Within ninety days, the Secretary determines whether the petition presents "scientific or commercial
information indicating that the petitioned action may be warranted." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(b)(3)(A). If so,
the Secretary has twelve months to make a final determination as to endangered or threatened statu. of
a species. Once listed, a species' status may be changed (delisted) only by a determination by the
Secretary that it is no longer threatened or endangered. There is surprisingly little case law on listing
decisions. See Coggins, supra note 5, at 1453-59.
10. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(2).
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course of action which may affect a listed species, a biological opinion is
developed through the consultation process by FWS. Should the FWS
conclude that the action will result in jeopardy to a listed species, the acting
agency must either modify or drop the project if it is to be in compliance
with the ESA.11 Thus a jeopardy opinion effectively either vetoes a project
or forces the agency to implement mitigation measures.
The duties not to jeopardize the existence of a species or destroy its
critical habitat must be considered absolute after the landmark Supreme
Court decision in TVA v. Hill,a" the snail darter case. Rarely has the Court
been presented with such a clear cut factual scenario: "The proposed
impoundment of water behind the proposed Teleco Dam would result in
total destruction of the snail darter's habitat."1 TVA's proposed operation
of the dam would have resulted in the "eradication of an endangered
species." 14 Based on these facts, the Court found that the Act "admitted of
no exceptions" 15 and held that neither the continued appropriations of
money by Congress nor the expenditure of over a hundred million dollars
on the dam were sufficient to overcome the clear prohibition against
jeopardizing a listed species found in the ESA. Construction on the almost
completed dam was enjoined. The nonjeopardy duty articulated in TVA v.
Hillhas had a profound impact on federal agencies, forcing them to modify
or drop projects so as to avoid jeopardizing a listed species.16
TVA v. Hillremains a powerful case, notwithstanding the exceptions
to the ESA's nonjeopardy provisions which resulted from the ruling. 7 The
case stands as controlling precedent for situations where jeopardy will
occur as a result of an agency's action.' While the clear-cut factual
circumstances surrounding Hill are unlikely to arise again in the future,
!1.

Under the 1978 amendment to the ESA, the FWS has the obligation to suggest reasonable

and prudent alternatives to the consulting agency when it finds that a proposed action will jeopardize a
listed plant or animal. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(b)(3)(A).
12. 437 U.S. 153 (1978).
13. Id. at 162 (emphasis omitted).

14. Id. at 174 (emphasis omitted).
15. Id. at 173.
16. See, e.g., Cabinet Mountains Wilderness/Scotchman's Peak Grizzly Bears v. Peterson, 685
F.2d 678 (D.C. Cir. 1982). There the FWS issued ajeopardy opinion on a mineral exploration program
because it affected key grizzly bear habitat in the Kootenai Forest in northwest Montana. FWS

outlined an alternative proposal that restricted seasonal access, eliminated a nearby timber sale and
closed roads. These actions offset impacts of the drilling program, and thus the bear would not be

jeopardized. The court upheld the permit, because the Forest Service "reasonably concluded that the
project (with mitigation) would not jeopardize the continued existence of the grizzly bear." Id. at 687.
17. Following the decision in Hill, Congress enacted amendments to the ESA in 1978 which
established an exemption process for projects jeopardizing listed species. These provisions are codified
at 16 U.S.C. §§ 1536(g) and (h). To date, the complicated process established by the amendments has

never been used.
18. See, e.g., Riverside Irrigation Dist. v. Andrews, 568 F. Supp. 583, 587-89 (D. Colo. 1983);
North Slope Burough v. Andrus, 642 F.2d 589, 607 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
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the Court's sweeping policy declarations and vivid insights as to congressional intent provide compelling arguments for any claim brought under
the ESA whenever the jeopardy of a species is at issue.

III.

THE AFFIRMATIVE DUTY TO RECOVER ENDANGERED SPECIES

In addition to the consultation duties and the prohibition against
jeopardizing listed species, section 7 contains another powerful mandate.
Every federal agency must affirmatively develop programs for the conservation of threatened and endangered species.1 9 The definition of "conservation" is as follows: "The terms 'conserve,' 'conserving,' and 'conservation' mean to use and the use of all methods and procedures which are
necessary to bring any endangered species or threatened species to the
point at which the measures provided pursuant to this chapter are no longer
20
necessary.
This broad definition recognizes no limit to the affirmative duties
imposed on federal agencies by section 7. Simply, the duty requires
agencies to use "all methods and procedures" needed to bring listed species
to the point where they no longer need the protection of the ESA. There are
no qualifications extended with regard to economic efficiency or political
expediency, nor is any limit suggested as to the number of "conservation"
measures which must be employed. Instead, the ESA, in clear and
unequivocal language, demands all agencies of the federal government to
work ceaselessly for the recovery of listed species.
The duty to conserve, then, is distinct from the duty not to jeopardize
listed species or to destroy their critical habitat. It is not enough for a
federal agency simply to avoid actions which might negatively impact
listed species and to consult with the Fish and Wildlife Service. In addition
to these responsibilities, agencies must continuously develop programs
which positively affect rare plants and animals and which will bring them
to the point where they can be taken off the list of threatened and
endangered species.
A.

Interpreting the Duty to Conserve Endangered Species

1. Legislative History
While the duty to conserve threatened and endangered species has
received only intermittent attention from either federal agencies or the
courts, a review of the ESA's legislative history, judicial interpretations of
this history and the Act itself underscore the importance of the conservation duty.

19.
20.

16 U.S.C. § 1536(a)(1).
16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).
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In 1973, as the congressional conference committee report on the ESA
noted,2 1 the bill which passed the House of Representatives failed to define
the meaning of the term "conservation." The Senate, however, recognizing
the importance of such a definition to the overall purposes of the ESA,
defined conservation:
to include generally the kinds of activities that might be engaged
to improve the status of endangered and threatened species so
that they would no longer require special treatment. The concept
of conservation covers the full spectrum of such activities: from
total "hands-off" policies involving protection from harassment
to a careful and intensive program of control.22
The Supreme Court in TVA v. Hill noted that Congress had spoken
with clarity and purposz in drafting both the nonjeopardy prohibition and
the conservation duty found in section 7. "The plain intent of Congress in
enacting this statute was to halt and reverse the trend toward species
extinction, whatever the cost. This is reflected not only in the stated policies
of the Act, but in literally every section of the statute. '2'3 The Court further
elaborated that section 7 created an unprecedented and paramount
obligation, stating flatly that the "legislative history undergirding § 7
reveals an explicit congressional decision to require agencies to give first
priority to the declared national policy of saving endangered species." 24
That Congress fully intended the affirmative duties of the ESA to take
priority over other agency responsibilities was made manifest in 1978 when
the ESA was amended. These amendments, in the wake of TVA v. Hill,
focused on the need to create a limited mechanism for circumventing
section 7's jeopardy prohibition. 5 It is noteworthy, however, that nothing
was done to modify the conservation duties imposed by the Act. Indeed,
amendments to accomplish such an objective were squarely rejected. As
the committee reports show, the American Mining Congress proposed to
amend section 7(a)(1) so as to clearly relegate the ESA's conservation
responsibilities to a secondary role that was subservient to the agency's
primary mission. These proposed changes in the Act were rejected in
28
committee and never reached the floor of either House.

21. Conf. Rep. No. 93-740,93rd Cong., Ist Sess. 2, reprintedin 1973 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 3002.
22. Id.
23. Hill, 437 U.S. at 184.
24. Id. at 185.
25. 16 U.S.C. § 1536(g).
26. Amending the EndangeredSpecies Act of 1973: HearingsonS. 2899 before the Subcomm.
on Resource Protectionof the Senate Committee on Environment andPublic Works, 95th Cong., 2d
Sess. 361-62 (1978).
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Cases Construing the Duty to Conserve

While Congress clearly expected section 7's conservation requirements to trigger action on the part of federal agencies, the exact
parameters of the duty await comprehensive definition by the courts. The
provision has been discussed in a handful of opinions, but none completely
define its mandate. It is apparent, however, that the breadth of the
conservation duty is slowly being expanded through judicial interpretations as appropriate factual settings for its application are brought into
court.
The first, and as such, one of the more significant cases considering the
provision occurred in 1977 in Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus.2 Plaintiffs
sought to have the Department of Interior found in violation of the ESA for
allowing hunting of migratory birds one-half hour before sunrise and onehalf hour after sunset. They argued that poor lighting at dawn and dusk
made it likely that hunters would mistakenly shoot endangered migratory
birds along with legally taken species. The government countered by
stating that the Act only required that hunting not jeopardize listed
species, and that the loss of habitat, not the incidental taking of endangered
birds was the critical issue in determining jeopardy.2
Judge Gezell viewed the ESA differently than the Department of the
Interior. Noting the strict definition of "conservation" in the Act, the
Judge wrote:" [T] he Fish and Wildlife Service, as part of Interior, must do
more than merely avoid the elimination of protected species. It must bring
these species back from the brink so that they may be removed from the
protected class, and it must use all methods necessary to do so. ' ' 29 The court
overturned the hunting regulations because "[ulnder the Endangered
Species Act of 1973 the agency has an affirmative duty to increase the
population of protected species." 30
The conservation duty was again recognized a year later in Conner v.
Andrus,31 but, on somewhat similar facts, another court reached an
opposite conclusion. In Conner,the Fish and Wildlife Service promulgated
regulations prohibiting all duck hunting in parts of Texas, New Mexico
and Arizona so as to protect the endangered Mexican Duck. The court,
while recognizing the affirmative duty of the agency to conserve endangered species, overturned the regulations, finding that a ban on hunting
would not increase the Mexican Duck population. 32 In addition, the court
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.
32.

428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977).
Id. at 168-69.
Id. at 170.
id.
453 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
Id. at 1041.
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also felt that it was important to balance the adverse effects on hunting
against the conservation effects of the regulations."3
As judicial interpretations of the conservation duty have continued,
the Connerholding has become increasingly isolated. Not only has the duty
to conserve been upheld and extended in subsequent cases, but the
balancing test employed by the court has not been used elsewhere. Indeed,
the mandatory language of the ESA leaves little room for the courts to
consider competing interests when endangered species are at stake.
For four years after Conner,there was judicial silence on the scope of
the conservation duties imposed by the ESA. Federal agencies continued to
focus their efforts on avoiding the ESA's jeopardy provisions during this
period and no cases are reported in which an agency was challenged for
failing to meet its affirmative duties under the Act.
In 1982 however, the government, for the first time, used the
conservation duties imposed by the ESA as an affirmative defense. In
Carson-Truckee Water Conservancy Districtv. Clark,34 a federal district
court upheld the Secretary of Interior's decision to give priority to use of a
reclamation project's waters for two species of endangered fish. Members
of the irrigation district sued the Department for release of water for
irrigation needs. The irrigation district urged a construction of the Act
wherein "the Secretary is only obligated to avoid jeopardizing the bare
survival of these species. ' 35
The court rejected this argument, finding that the Secretary was
upholding his duty under the ESA by using reclamation project waters as
part of a program to recover the endangered fish. Citing both Conners3"
and Defenders of Wildlife v. Andrus,37 the court found that under section
7(a)(1): "the Secretary is required to give the Pyramid Lake fishery
priority over all other purposes of [the reclamation project's waters] until
the Cui-ui fish and the Lahontan cutthroat trout are no longer classified as
endangered." 3' Thus, in the court's view, not only was it permissible for the
Secretary to develop a program for restoring the fish to non-endangered
population levels, the Secretary was required to do so.
In response to the decision in Carson-Truckee, the Solicitor of the
33. Id.
34. 549 F. Supp. 704 (D.Nev. 1982), a fdinpart,vacatedin part,741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984),
cert. denied, 105 S. Ct. 1842 (1985). The endangered speicies were two fish, the Cui-ui and the
Lahontan cutthroat trout, both residents of Pyramid Lake. To increase their populations, theSecretary
undertook a program of water release from the Stampede Dam to insure a supply of cold water in the
Truckee River which provides spawning habitat for the fish. The plaintiffs wanted this water released
for irrigation purposes even though this would have hindered the program for the recovery of the fish.
35. Carson-Truckee, 549 F. Supp. at 709.
36. 453 F. Supp. 1037 (W.D. Tex. 1978).
37. 428 F. Supp. 167 (D.D.C. 1977).
38. 549 F. Supp. at 710.
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Department of Interior drafted a guidance memorandum for use by the
Fish and Wildlife Service which expressly rejected the district court's
holding that the conservation provisions of the ESA require federal
agencies to give priority to threatened and endangered species until they no
longer need the Act's protections.3 9 According to the Solicitor, section
7(a)(1) has the more limited purpose of allowing, but not mandating
federal agencies to integrate endangered species considerations into their
planning processes. 40 In reaching this conclusion, the opinion argued that
because section 7(a)(1) does not contain the explicit language found in
section 7(a)(2), it cannot be construed to have the same decisive effect as
the ESA's prohibition against jeopardy.4 1 As support for this rather
subjective analysis of the plain language of the Act, the opinion cites the
lack of a detailed legislative history on the conservation duties of the ESA
as contrasted with the exhaustive treatment of the Act's jeopardy provision, and points to the problems which might arise if agencies were required
to give their conservation duties priority over other responsibilities.
The circuit court decision in Carson-Truckee,4 2 and the subsequent
decisions in National Wildlife Federationv. Hode13 and Sierra Club v.
Clark,44 all find more substance in the conservation requirements of the
ESA than was acknowledged by the Solicitor. Each decision firmly held
that the Secretary is mandated to pursue action for the conservation of
endangered species, but it is fair to say the none of the opinions defined the
ultimate extent of the conservation requirement.
In affirming the district court holding in Carson-Truckee,the Ninth
Circuit wrote: "[Slection 7(a)(1), moreover, specifically directs that the
Secretary 'shall' use programs administered by him to further the
conservation purposes of ESA. Those sections, as the district court found,
'45
direct that the Secretary actively pursue a species conservation policy.
While the court was careful to underscore the unequivocal nature of
section 7(a)(1), it also noted that the question arose of how to resolve a
direct conflict between the conservation duty and another statute. The
court did not rule on the extent of the Secretary's duty had he chosen not to
48
protect fish.
In 1984 the ESA's conservation requirements were once again

39.
Northern
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.

Department of Interior Solicitor's Opinion, Sept. 7, 1983. (available from the office of the
Rockies Resource Clinic, Missoula, Montana).
Id. at 5.
Id.
741 F.2d 257 (9th Cir. 1984).
Slip. Op. No. S-85-037 EJG (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 1985).
755 F.2d 608 (1985).
741 F.2d at 261-62 (citation omitted).
Id. at 262. n. 5.
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brought under judicial scrutiny. In Sierra Club v. Clark,4 7 the State of
Minnesota and the Department of Interior proposed a sport trapping

season on the Eastern Timber Wolf, a threatened species in northern
Minnesota. The season, when challenged, was struck down. The federal
district court found," [f] rom a plain reading of the Act and research into its
legislative history . . . the Secretary clearly has an affirmative duty to
bring the wolf population to the point where the protections of the Act are
48
no longer needed."
The Interior Department attempted to defend the proposed hunt by

relying on the broad language found in the definition of "conservation,"
asserting that a regulated taking was allowed "in the extraordinary case
where population pressures within a given ecosystem cannot otherwise be
relieved. . . 2 9 The court dismissed this argument by finding that the
Department had not proven such extraordinary circumstances existed

prior to authorizing the hunt. 50 Without such proof, the court held, a
trapping season was inimical to the clearly expressed congressional goals of
the ESA.5" The Eighth Circuit affirmed Judge Miles Lord's prohibition of
sport trapping, also relying on the legislative history of the term "conserva-

tion."'52 However, neither court relied on this definition expressly within
the context of section 7. Indeed, the Minnesota wolf kill decisions may
ultimately be viewed as "takings" cases rather than affirmative duty cases.
Still, the repeated references to congressional history and strict construction of "conservation" will buttress future attempts to solidify the section 7

duty to conserve.
The most recent affirmative duty case provides perhaps the clearest
delineation of the conservation duty. In National Wildlife Federationv.
Hodel,5 3 plaintiffs alleged that the Secretary violated his duty under
section 7(a) (1) by failing to take steps to stop bald eagle mortality resulting
from the ingestion of lead shot even though such steps would clearly have
47. 577 F. Supp. 783 (D. Minn. 1984), affd, 755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1985). This litigation began
nearly a decade earlier. In Fund for Animals v. Andrus, I1 Env't Rep. Cas. (BNA) 2189 (D. Minn.
1978), FWS was enjoined from trapping wolves unless the trapping was directed at specific wolves
committing livestock depradations.
48. Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. at 789.
49. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).
50. This case has created a major controversy in Montana over the state's annual grizzly bear
hunting season. While the grizzly is listed as threatened under the Endangered Species Act, neither the
state nor the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service has ever found that such extraordinary circumstances exist
so as to warrant the hunt. The Montana Department of Fish, Wildlife and Parks has just released an
environmental impact statement in the hopes of meeting this high standard, and the FWS will
apparently continue to approve a grizzly hunting season on an annual basis. See 50 C.F.R. § 17.40(b)
(1985).
51. Sierra Club v. Clark, 577 F. Supp. at 788-89.
52. Sierra Club v. Clark, 755 F.2d at 613-15.
53. Slip Op. No. S-85-0837 EJG (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 1985).
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prevented additional fatalities. Plaintiffs introduced evidence compiled by
the Interior Department that showed that eagles were eating ducks and
geese crippled by lead gunshot during the hunting season and that the
eagles were often dying of secondary lead poisoning. Between 1976 and
1985, at least ninety-six eagles died from consuming toxic lead shot.
According to the Federation, the Secretary had the option under the ESA
of either closing the hunting season in areas heavily used by eagles or
requiring the use of nontoxic steel shot.54
The government countered that while the ESA did impose an
affirmative duty to conserve endangered wildlife, the Department of
Interior had complete discretion to pick and choose which conservation
measures to employ. 5 The court rejected this contention:
[D]efendants have not clearly identified the factors which the
agency considers relevant to their choosing to authorize the use of
lead shot in the disputed areas. Moreover, assuming defendants
correctly identified the factors which are relevant to their
decision, defendants have failed to articulate a rational connection between the factors found and the choice that they made.
This court, finding no clearly articulated factors considered by
defendant in choosing this course of action, has no basis upon
which to uphold defendants' choice. 6
The court held that not only did the Department have a duty to consider
appropriate conservation measures, but that it was also required to clearly
7
document why such measures were rejected.1
Under Hodel, the proper standard for reviewing an agency's responsibilities under section 7(a)(1) requires the agency first to consider a
reasonable range of programs or actions that will lead to the recovery of
listed species and then to specify the basis for rejecting any particular
measure. Given that the duties imposed by the ESA require agencies "to
afford first priority to the declared national policy of saving endangered
species," 58 it is difficult to imagine a rational basis for rejecting any
reasonable conservation effort. Under Hodel, it appears that private

54. Id. at 2-3.
55. Id. at 9.
56. Id. at 9-10.
57. In reaching this conclusion, the court was careful to set out the standard of review used. Id. at
8.The court stated:
[Dlefendants violated the ESA only if defendants' actions were "arbitrary, capricious, an
abuse of discretion or otherwise not in accordance with (the) law." 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A);
see also Village of False Pass v. Clark, 733 F.2d 605, 609 (9th Cir. 1984): "Under this
standard, administrative action is upheld if the agency has 'considered the relevant factors
and articulated a rational connection between the facts found and the choice made.'"
Baltimore Gas & Electric Co. v. Natural Resource Defense Council, Inc., 462 U.S. 87, 105.
58. TVA v. Hill, 437 U.S. at 185.
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organizations and individuals may suggest conservation strategies with the
expectation that agencies will give them serious consideration, either
voluntarily or under court order.
3. Implementing the Duty to Conserve
The gradual clarification of the ESA's affirmative conservation
responsibilities by the courts has significant implications for federal
agencies. At both the program and project level, the expanding duties of
the ESA promise to affect many aspects of federal decision making, forcing
both a more thorough consideration of threatened and endangered species
issues and a reshaping of project design and implementation. Some of these
changes have already begun while others are just now beginning to emerge.
For example, the grizzly bear is listed as a threatened species. 59 As
part of its effort to protect the bear and encourage its recovery, FWS has
developed a recovery plan 0 and identified six major ecosystems that can
support viable grizzly populations.6 1 As the chart for the Northern
Continental Divide Ecosystem indicates, nearly all of the habitat needed to
support a sustaining grizzly population is situated on federal land.
NORTHERN CONTINENTAL DIVIDE ECOSYSTEM OCCUPATIONAL
HABITAT

Administrative Unit

6 2

Current Occupied Habitat Acres
(Thousand)

National Forest
Flathead
Helena
Lewis & Clark
Lolo
Kootenai
Subtotal

2056
180
776
281
207
3500

59. 50 C.F.R. § 17.11 (1985).
60. Under the ESA, the Secretary is directed to develop recovery plans "for the conservation and
survival of endangered species and threatened species ... unless he finds that such a plan will not
promote the conservation of the species." 16 U.S.C. § 1533(0.
61. The six ecosystems are: Greater Yellowstone (Yellowstone Park and surrounding lands in
Montana, Idaho and Wyoming); Northern Continental Divide (northern Montana); SelwayBitterroot (Montana and Idaho); Cabinet Yaak (Northwestern Montana); North Cascades (northern
Washington); and Selkirk (Idaho). The recovery goals for each of these areas are delineated in the
GRIZZLY BEAR RECOVERY PLAN implemented January 29,1982 by Robert Jantzen, Director of FWS.
62. U.S. FOREST SERVICE, FLATHEAD NATIONAL FOREST FINAL ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT
STATEMENT E-4 (1986).
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1014
24

Indian Reserve

362

State*

196

Private*
Total

454
5500

* Approximated Acres

Arguably, the duty to conserve should be pre-eminent for all management activities initiated by the federal government in the Northern
Continental Divide Ecosystem. Indeed such activities are wide ranging, as
the area is important for commercial timber harvests, a myriad of
recreational activities and potential oil and natural gas exploration and
development. Yet management decisions are not always made with the
conservation of the bear in mind.
The reluctance of federal land management agencies to fully integrate the conservation requirements of the ESA into their management
activities is illustrated by a dispute over natural gas development in the
Lewis and Clark National Forest. A nonjeopardy opinion was issued for a
proposed gas well. However, the Forest Service's Environmental Assessment"' noted that the proposed well would inhibit bear recovery to optimal
levels in the area. 4 Thus the Forest Service was approving a project that
would lessen the chances of recovery, rather than taking all measures
necessary to conserve the species."
While recognizing the conservation duty in general, the government
contended that agencies have wide discretion in developing conservation
programs. In this case, the Forest Service had no duty to recover
populations to their full potential, and could select whatever conservation
measures it chose.6 6 The Forest Service also cited other, unrelated
63. The Bureau of Land Management has the authority to issue leases and approve drilling
permits for minerals on federal lands. 30 U.S.C. § 352 (1982). By agreement, the Forest Service
conducts environmental analyses on mineral production activities on Forest Service lands as required
by the National Environmental Policy Act. 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370 (1982).
64. Hall Creek Environment Assessment at 100, Appendix C-2, C-27 (1985)(available from the
Northern Rockies Resource Clinic, Missoula, Montana). The Environmental Assessment found that
the biological potential of the area was four adult female grizzlies. However, if the well was in place,
even with full mitigation, the area would provide habitat for only two female adult grizzlies.
65. The Environmental Assessment and Finding of No Significant Impact was appealed by
numerous conservation groups. Glacier - Two Medicine Alliance et al., 85 Interior Board of Land
Appeals (IBLA) 445. (Notice of appeal filed March 1, 1985) (available from the Northern Rockies
Resource Clinic, Missoula, Montana).
66. Answer of the Department of the Interior, Glacier - Two Medicine Alliance et al., 85 1BLA
445 at 448-50. (available from the Northern Rockies Resource Clinic, Missoula, Montana). This
answer, in the manner of a reply brief, was filed by the Department of the Interior as a response to legal
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programs that fulfilled its duty to conserve.1 7 The agency's message was
clear: an unlimited conservation duty on each project "would act as a total
bar to uses of federal land identified as potential habitat for endangered or
threatened species." 6 8 In remanding the case, the Interior Board of Land
69
Appeals did not reach the conservation duty issue.

The government's argument that the ESA's conservation language

provides the agency with virtually unlimited latitude in the development of
such programs is not surprising in light of the Solicitor's Opinion discussed
earlier.70 Such a view, however, falls short of the conservation obligations
imposed on the Fish and Wildlife Service in National Wildlife Federation

v. Hodel.7 1The rejection of any particular measure must be based on the
reasonable consideration of that measure and the articulation of those

considerations which preclude the measure's adoption. Failure to provide
evidence of such consideration or to articulate the thinking behind the
decisions will place the agency in violation of the ESA.
There are indications, however, that federal agencies are beginning to
pay closer attention to the conservation duties of section 7. A case in point is

endangered wolves and forest planning. Like the grizzly, the endangered
gray wolf is targeted for recovery in the remote mountains of Montana and
Idaho.7 2 One such area exists in central Idaho and occupies parts of the
Clearwater National Forest.7 3 The Forest Service, as part of a nation-wide
74
planning effort is currently preparing a forest plan for the Clearwater.
This plan will allocate the Clearwater's lands to various activities and
identify prescriptions for managing such activities. Because implementing
the plan will affect the gray wolf, the ESA was triggered and the Forest
Service initiated consultation with FWS.
issues raised by conservation groups in their Statement of Reasons filed in support of the appeal of the
drilling permit.
67. Id. at 50.
68. Id. at 48.
69. Glacier - Two Medicine Alliance et al., 88 IBLA 133 (1985). The decision turned on the
agency's failure to ensure against jeopardy. The jeopardy problem involved the failure of the Forest
Service to guarantee that it could implement mitigation measures designed to reduce mortality, which
FWS had required as part of its original nonjeopardy opinion.
70. See supra note 39 and accompanying text.
71. Slip Op. No. S-85-0837 EJG (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26, 1985).
72. See U.S. FISH AND WILDLIFE SERVICE, NORTHERN ROCKY MOUNTAIN WOLF RECOVERY
PLAN (Revised Agency Review Draft, Dec. 1985). The Plan proposes three recovery areas: Northwest
Montana, Central Idaho and the greater Yellowstone area. These areas encompass large blocks of
federal land which are relatively free from human disturbance and which have an adequate prey base.
73. The Clearwater National Forest covers slightly more than 1.8 million acres of land in
northcentral Idaho. Nearly 1.2 million acres on the forest are either designated wilderness or roadless
lands. In addition to wolves, the Clearwater contains other signficiant resources, such as an outstanding
coldwater fishery, large populations of elk and deer, and of course, timber.
74. The forest planning requirements are contained in the National Forest Management Act, 16
U.S.C. §§ 1600, 1611-1614 (1982).
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The Biological Opinion prepared by FWS on the Clearwater concluded that implementing the proposed forest plan would not jeopardize
the gray wolf. 5 However, after reaching the nonjeopardy conclusion, FWS
noted the precarious nature of wolf populations in Idaho, and incorporated
a lengthy series of conservation recommendations into the Opinion.7 6 The
most controversial recommendations contained in the Opinion suggested
that the Forest Service refrain from developing and roading certain areas
7
of the forest which contained key wolf habitat components.
As a result of the Biological Opinion, FWS and the Forest Service
entered into further discussions concerning conservation strategies on the
Clearwater. These discussions led to a supplemental Biological Opinion in
which the FWS retracted some of their recommendations which would
have most infringed on timber production but retained others.1 8 The Forest
Service in turn agreed to keep one important area roadless, to close certain
roads to public use and to involve the FWS in the design of timber sales and
road construction.7 9 While it is arguable whether this compromise offers
sufficient concessions to wolf recovery, the Forest Service clearly changed
management direction where the FWS identified specific conservation
measures.
The Clearwater Forest Plan and the Hall Creek project provide
interesting studies in the way in which the ESA's conservation duty is
slowly beginning to affect agency decisions and to redefine management
alternatives. If judicial construction continues to develop along the lines of
Hodel and Carson-Truckee, conservation considerations will play an
increasingly larger role in agency thinking. In the Northern Rockies,
where habitat requirements of grizzlies and wolves can range across
hundreds of thousands of acres, agencies may have to put off many types of
development activities until the grizzly and the wolf have been recovered.
IV.

THOU SHALL NOT TAKE

With most of the attention focused on section 7 duties, it is not
surprising that other parts of the Act have received limited judicial

75. Biological Opinion on the Proposed Clearwater National Forest Plan, August 15, 1985,
William F. Shake, Assistant Regional Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service, Portland, Oregon
(available from the Northern Rockies Resource Clinic, Missoula, Montana).
76. According to the Opinion, there are fewer than fifteen wolves in central Idaho with only
infrequent sitings being recorded in the Clearwater. Id. at 5, 14.
77. Id. at 16-19.
78. Letter from William F. Shake, Assistant Regional Director, U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service,
to James Bates, Forest Supervisor, Clearwater National Forest, March 21, 1986. (available from the
Northern Rockies Resource Clinic, Missoula, Montana).
79. See, Biological Opinion, supra note 75 at 16-19; letter from William Shake to James Bates,
supra note 78.
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scrutiny. Yet the implications of broad judicial interpretation go beyond
the affirmative duty under section 7. This is especially true for section 9 of.
the Act, the "takings" provision.
Section 9 makes it unlawful to take any endangered species.80 Taking
is defined to include any action to "harass, harm, pursue, hunt, wound...
or attempt to engage in such conduct." 8' Harass is defined by regulation as
negligent or intentional disruption of the normal behavior patterns of an
endangered animal.82 Most significantly, harm is defined to include
activities that result in significant environmental modification or degradation of an endangered species' habitat. 8
These definitions expand the application of section 9 far beyond the
affirmative duty provision of section 7. Because section 9 makes it
"unlawful for any person"s4 to take an endangered species, federal action
is not required. The definition of harm to encompass habitat destruction or
modification provides a much broader standard than an affirmative duty to
conserve. The spectrum of government and private activities that modify or
destroy habitat is overwhelming-air, water, soil and noise pollution,
urban growth, resource development and outdoor recreation activities, to
name a few.8 5 Add to this range of activities the scope of endangered
species' habitat and the implication of a broad application of section 9 is
clear.
Two 1980 cases set forth divergent opinions on section 9. In North
Slope Borough v. Andrus,88 plaintiffs sought to prevent the authorization
of oil and gas leases in the Beaufort Sea north of Alaska. 7 Despite the
distinct possibility of habitat modification and mortality to the endangered
bowhead whale from drilling, the court concluded that this would result at
most in a future taking and declined to find a violation of the ESA. s8
Because plaintiff sought to prevent leasing rather than drilling and
exploration activities, the court's reluctance to find a taking is
understandable.
By contrast, the facts in Palilav. HawaiiDepartment of Land and

80.

16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1).

81. 16 U.S.C. § 1532(19).
82. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1985).
83. Id.
84. 16 U.S.C. § 1538(a)(1) (emphasis added).
85. See Coggins, supra note 5 at 1469-72 for a more in-depth discussion of the history and
implicatons of section 9.
86. 486 F. Supp. 332 (D.D.C.), affd in part,rev'd in part, 642 F.2d 589 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
87. Leasing was being conducted pursuant to the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (OSCLA),
43 U.S.C. §§ 1331-1356 (1982). Leasing is but one of several stages of development under OSCLA.
Each stage is subject to administrative review and environmental analysis. The ESA applies to all
stages under OSCLA. See Conservation Law Foundation v. Andrus, 623 F.2d 712 (Ist Cir. 1979).
88. 486 F. Supp. at 362.
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NaturalResources8 9 presented a real and immediate threat to endangered
species. The endangered Palila bird's only remaining habitat was being
destroyed by feral sheep and goats. The Hawaii Department of Land and
Natural Resources sought to maintain the sheep and goats for sport
hunting, notwithstanding the continued destruction by the sheep and goats
of the Palila's bird's only known habitat.90 Finding the acts and omissions
of the Department clearly within the regulation's definition of "harm," the
court enjoined the defendant from maintaining the sheep and goats, and
ordered them eradicated. 9 The Ninth Circuit upheld the decision, which
provides the strongest support to date that habitat modification constitutes
a taking under section 9.9 2The rationale expressed by the Ninth Circuit has
yet to be applied in other circumstances. The only significant attempt by
conservationists to apply the habitat modification regulations93 occurred in
a dispute surrounding an emergency deer hunt in the Florida Everglades.94
The court found insufficient evidence to conclude a taking would occur. 5
In 1982, the takings provision was amended to permit an incidental
taking of endangered species where such a taking was expressly authorized
by the Secretary.9 8 This provision received judicial interpretation in
Friendsof EndangeredSpecies v. Jantzen.97 Although the Ninth Circuit
in Jantzen upheld the taking of habitat utilized by the endangered Mission
Blue butterfly, the decision does not restrict future application of section 9.
The facts of Jantzen differ markedly from Palila. A real estate
developer sought to develop several thousand acres of San Bruno Mountain. Part of this included grassland habitat essential to the Mission Blue
butterfly. However, the developer submitted a Habitat Conservation Plan

89. 471 F. Supp. 985 (D. Hawaii 1979), aff'd, 639 F.2d 495 (9th Cir. 1981).
90. 471 F. Supp. at 988-90. The feral animals browsed on the leaves, stems and seedlings of two
species of trees that are essential for the Palila's feeding and nesting. The case against the feral animals'
destruction of the Palila's habitat was well documented and essentially non-controverted.
91. Id. at 990.
92. Palila, 639 F.2d at 497.
93. 50 C.F.R. § 17.3 (1985).
94. Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Florida Game and Fresh Water Fish Comm'n, 550 F. Supp 1206
(S.D. Fla. 1982).
95. Id. at 1210. The issue was a controversial emergency deer hunt implemented to avert mass
starvation resulting from an unusually severe flooding of the Everglades. Plaintiffs argued that
increased access by hunters via airboats and all-terrain vehicles would harrass and harm the habitat of
the endangered Florida Panther, Everglades Kite and Indigo Snake. Id. In addition to the lack of
concrete evidence that the activities would disrupt the animals, there apparently was a serious question
as to whether the animals inhabitated the hunting area.
The First Circuit has also touched on section 9. In Romero Barcelo v. Brown, 643 F.2d 835 (1st
Cir. 1981), the plaintiff argued that activity at a Navy bombing site constituted a taking because it was
harassing populations of endangered fish. The court found a similarity between this argument and
plaintiff's section 7 jeopardy claim, and remanded both. Id. at 858.
96. 16 U.S.C. § 1539.
97. 760 F.2d 976 (9th Cir. 1985).
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based on the Biological Study conducted by FWS.9a The plan dedicated
nearly 800 acres to local agencies and preserved 86% of the butterfly's
habitat. Moreover, the plan promised $60,000 annually to improve the
species' habitat.9 9 While some taking of habitat would occur as a result of
the development, the agency concluded and the court agreed that the
overall effect of the plan "was likely to enhancethe survival of the Mission
Blue butterfly."' 100
The court concluded that FWS had met its statutory obligations in
approving an incidental taking.'10 Given the facts relied upon by the court,
such a decision was reasonable. 02
It is important to recognize that the ESA's prohibition against taking
extends only to species listed as endangered. However, both agency
practice and judicial interpretation extend the Act's protections to
threatened species. When a species is listed as threatened, the ESA
requires the Secretary to adopt regulations providing for the conservation
of the species.103 Through these regulations, the ESA expressly authorizes
the Secretary to prohibit the taking of any threatened species. 04 Under
this provision, the Secretary has promulgated blanket regulations which
prohibit individuals from taking any threatened species unless a permit to
do so has been issued through the Fish and Wildlife Service. 105
In an important test of the Secretary's discretion to authorize the
taking of threatened species, the Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals held in
SierraClub v. Clark'0 6 that the Secretary could permit such an occurrence
only under the most exacting circumstances. As has been discussed, the
case involved a proposal to permit a limited sport trapping season on the
threatened timber wolf population in northern Minnesota. The Secretary
98. Id. at 980.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 982 (emphasis in original). The court noted that the habitat improvement fund would
be used to eliminate shrubs that were encroaching on the butterfly's grassland habitat. Additionally,

the court noted that as a result of the restrictions included in the realtor's development scheme, such as
park land and open space, a substantial amount of habitat would be permanently protected.

101. Id. The court set forth a four-part test to ascertain the legitimacy of the taking under 16
U.S.C. § 1539: (1) whether it was incidental, (2) whether the FWS permit minimizes impacts to the
maximum extent possible, (3) whether there is adequate funding for the Conservation Plan, and (4)
whether the taking will appreciably reduce the likelihood of the species' survival. The appellant

challenged FWS actions regarding the second and fourth criteria. The court rejected both challenges.
102. In addition, the court looked to the congressional hearings on the 1982 amendments, which
referred to the San Bruno Mountain Conservation Plan as an excellent model of what must be done

before a takings is permissible. Id. at 982-83.
103. 16 U.S.C. § 1533(d).
104.

Id.

105. 50 C.F.R. § 17.31 (1985).
106.

755 F.2d 608 (8th Cir. 1985). See supra notes 47-52 and accompanying text, where the

implications of this case and the affirmative duty are discussed.
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argued that provisions in the ESA directing him to issue regulations for the
conservation of threatened species implicitly granted the authority to allow
a taking of such species to occur. 107 The court resolved the issue by focusing
upon the definition of conservation; a regulated taking can occur only in the
"extraordinary case where population pressures within a given ecosystem
cannot otherwise be relieved.
.""' This provision when read in concert
with the entire Act established the parameters of the Secretary's authority.
Since no showing of an extraordinary case had been made, the court held
that the Secretary did not have the discretion to permit the regulated
taking of wolves.' 0 9 It should be noted, however, that the court expressly
affirmed the Secretary's authority to establish a control program to take
individual wolves preying on livestock." 0
Another recent pronouncement on the takings issue came in the
previously discussed case, National Wildlife Federationv. Hodel, for its
holding on the ESA's conservation duties. In that case, the court found that
because the FWS authorized activities that directly contributed to the
death of bald eagles, a taking was present: "[T]he defendants' authorization of lead shot for hunting in the 1985-86 hunting season. . . constitutes
such a taking.""'
The FWS in Hodel submitted a mitigation plan aimed at minimizing
the taking. Unlike the plan in Jantzen, the court concluded that the FWS's
mitigation measures "would do nothing to mitigate the incidental taking of
bald eagles this coming hunting season."' 1 2 The court imposed a strict
standard on the sufficiency of a mitigation plan. Future promises of
reduced taking, no matter how effective, do not obviate the need for
immediate mitigation." 3
As case law on the takings provision continues to emerge, actions
harming listed species will be further curtailed. Given the breadth of the
definition of takings, conservation groups will attempt to have it applied to
a wide variety of circumstances. If courts continue to uphold these
interpretations, it will have a significant impact on private and governmental activities.

107.

Id. at 612.

108.

16 U.S.C. § 1532(3).

109.

755 F.2d at 613-18.

110.
111.

Id. at 614 n.8.
National Wildlife Fed'n v. Hodel, No. S-85-0837 EJG, slip op. at 10 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 26,

1985).
112. id. at 11.
113. The FWS proposed to eliminate lead shot for the 1986-87 hunting season. These future
promises were found to be inadequate because mortality would still occur.
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CONCLUSION

In 1977, the United States Supreme Court dramatically altered the
substantive duties imposed by the ESA by providing an encompassing
interpretation of section 7(a) (2). No longer a conservationist's wish list of
considerations the government ought to make when its actions affected
endangered species, the Act became an absolute yardstick against which
agency actions would be measured.
Nearly a decade later, a more gradual though no less important
evolution of other substantive duties imposed by the Act has occurred. In
addition to not jeopardizing the existence of endangered species, agencies
must take affirmative steps to promote their recovery. Moreover, neither
agencies nor private citizens may take actions that more than incidentally
contribute to the taking of the species or its habitat. While the precise
parameter of these requirements await further judicial delineation, the
affirmative duty and takings provisions of the Act will have a profound
impact on land management activities wherever endangered species are
present.

